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PATENT FAIRNESS ACT OF 1999: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING PATENTS FOR
PIPELINE DRUGS
I. INTRODUCTION

On April 28, 1999, during the 106th session of Congress, House
Representative Ed Bryant introduced the Patent Fairness Act of 1999 On
May 27, 1999, Senator Robert Torricelli introduced a similar measure,
known as the Drug Patent Term Restoration Review Procedure Act of
1999.2 The proposed legislation is an attempt to extend the patent life up to
an additional three years for the following pharmaceutical drugs: Claritin,
Relafen, Daypro, Dardiogen-82, Dermatop, Nimtop, Eulexin, Penetrex.3
These drugs, referred to as "pipeline" drugs, had received a patent but were
pending Federal Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter "FDA")
approval in 1984 when the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984' (hereinafter "Patent Term Restoration Act") was
enacted.
The Patent Term Restoration Act provides a five-year extension on
patent life for pharmaceutical drugs that require FDA approval before hitting
the market and whose patent life is reduced in obtaining such approval.' The
provision only applies if the drug obtains a patent or enters the FDA
approval phase after the statute's enactment." Therefore, a special provision
allowed the pipeline drugs to receive a maximum of a two-year extension,"
based partly on the assumption that these drugs would be approved within

' Patent Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 1598, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced in the House of
Representatives on April 28, 1999), avadabein WL 1999 CONG US HR 1598.
2 Drug Patent Term Restoration Review Procedure Act of 1999, S. 1172, 106th Cong. (1999)
(introduced in the Senate on May 27, 1999), available in WL 1999 CONG US S 1172.
1 James Frederick, GenerialndustryMobilmzestoFightPatent-ExtensionThrea, DRUG STORE NEWS,
August 30, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 10882446.
' Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984 & Supp. 1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections including: 35 U.S.C. S 156 (1984), 35
U.S.C. S 271 (1984 & Supp. 1999), and 21 U.S.C. S 355 (1999). The Drug Price Competition Act and the
Patent Term Restoration Act were introduced independently but combined when neither act could be
enacted separately.
5 35 U.S.C. S 156(g)(6).
6 Id S 156W(6)(A), W(6)(B).
' ,d S 156(,)(6)(C).
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that time.! However, some of these pipeline drugs spent between seven and
twenty-two years awaiting FDA approval. 9
Supporters of the Patent Fairness Act argue that the legislation is an
attempt to compensate the pipeline drug manufacturers for the unforeseen
delays in obtaining FDA approval, which diminished the life of their patents.
The proponents argue that the legislation establishes a fair and impartial
process, and not a guarantee, for pipeline patentees, seeking restoration of
lost patent life. Pipeline drugs were given only a two-year extension
pursuant to the Patent Term Restoration Act, based on a miscalculation of
approval time. At that time, FDA approval time averaged 2.25 years.
However, some drugs, including the pipeline drugs, spent at least five years
in the approval process.
The proponents attribute the delay to the shortage of resources at the
FDA, rather than to the medical safety concerns of the products. Since
Congress has extended patent life for similar inequities in the past, the
proponents argue for the same treatment. Furthermore, the treatment of
brand name drugs is quite disparate in comparison with generic drugs, which
do not require nearly the same amount of time and money in drug
development, and can often bypass most of the lengthy FDA approval
process. Finally, other patented inventions, such as computer components,
often receive the maximum patent life and require far less capital on
development than pharmaceutical drugs.
The opponents argue that the proposed legislation gives the
manufacturers of the pipeline drugs a windfall at the expense of consumers.
The provisions of the legislation practically guarantee an extension, since the
terms unfairly favor the patentee. Further, this issue, at least in the case of

LegislativeHearingonH.R.1598, "ThePatentFairnessActof 1999," Before the Subcommitteeon the
Courts and Intellectual PropertyCommittee on the Judiciary U.S. Home of Representatives, 106th Cong.
(1999), available in 1999 WL 461846 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt, partner at the law firm of

Covington & Burling).
9 See Marvin J. Powell, Independent Processfor FairPatentReview Will Assure Fairness, Advance
Intellectual PropertyRights, METROPOuTAN CoRp. COUNs., June 1999, at 25, available in Westlaw,
METCC Database (reporting that "fo]f 123 pipeline drugs, 17 spent more than five years in the NDA
[new drug approval] process after the completion of clinical trials. Several other pipeline drugs, Penetrex,
Dermatop, Nimotop, Relafen, and Claritin were subjected to extraordinarily long FDA reviews of over
seven years.
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Claritin, 0 has been debated before Congress and the extension has been
denied on more than one occasion.
The purpose of the Patent Term Restoration Act was to encourage future
development, and the pipeline drugs had already been developed at the time
of the statute's enactment. The pipeline drug manufacturers, however,
received more than they anticipated at the time they developed the drugs:
a two-year extension pursuant to the Patent Term Restoration Act for all of
the drugs, and additional time pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreement
Act for some. Furthermore, the brand name drug business, despite the cost
of research and development, is earning significant profits and is one of the
most profitable industries.
This note provides a background of the Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, the proposed Patent Fairness Act, the Drug Patent Term Restoration
Review Procedure Act, and then considers both the arguments in favor of
and against the proposed legislation.

]I. BACKGROUND
A. PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984

1. History. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act was enacted on September 24, 1984, as a compromise between brand
name drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers. Since "a patent
continues to run while the maker of the product is testing and awaiting
[FDA] approval to market it,"" the brand name drug manufacturers wanted
"restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while the product is
awaiting pre-market approval."12 By extending the life of a patent, the Act
expected "to create a new incentive for increased expenditures for research
and development of certain products which are subject to pre-market
government approval.""
In exchange for a restoration term, generic drug makers received an
abbreviated new drug approval (ANDA) procedure, whereby generic
10 Schering-Plough, the maker of Claritin is the major promoter of this legislation and has the most
invested in its passage. Therefore, some of the arguments have focused primarily on Claritin.
" H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(), at 15 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648; see aso H.R.

REP. No. 98-857(E) (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686.
" H.R. REP. NO. 98-8570), at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
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equivalents would surpass the lengthy FDA required clinical human testing
for safety and effectiveness, 4 provided the "generic [copy of any drug] is the
same [or similar] as the original [patented and/or previously approved]
drug.""5 Furthermore, the Act provides "that it is not an act of patent
infringement for a generic drug maker to import or to test a patented drug
in preparation for seeking FDA approval if marketing of the drug would
occur after expiration of the patent." 6 Without an extensive FDA approval
process and without waiting for the expiration of the patent to begin testing,
the Act "makes more low cost generic drugs" 7 available sooner.
2. Provisions. The Patent Term Restoration Act provides that the "term
of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or a
method of manufacturing a product shall be extended... from the original
expiration date of the patent""s if the following conditions are met: (1) an
application for an extension is submitted by the owner of a patent or an
agent before the expiration of the patent, 9 (2) "the term of the patent has
never been extended,"" (3) "the product has been subject to a regulatory
the product
review period before its commercial marketing or use," 2' and (4) 22
time.
first
the
for
marketing
commercial
for
approved
has been
The Patent Term Restoration Act provides that a patent term can be
extended "by the time equal to the regulatory review23 period" with the
following limitations. 2' The extension is reduced (1) by the time the
applicant failed to act with due diligence2" during the regulatory review
period,2" and (2) by one-half of the testing phase.2" For drugs which received
a patent or began the regulatory review after the statute's enactment, the
14

Id
o H.R. REP. NO. 98-8571), at 14 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
" 35 U.S.C. S 156(a) (1983).
Id 5 156(a)(1),(3).
Id S 156(a)(2).
21 Id. 5 156(a)(4).
- Id.
S 156(a)(5).
23 The term "regulatory review" is the sum of a testing phase and an agency approval phase. 35
U.S.C. S 156(,(1)(B)(i), (ii).
24Id S 156(c).
The term "due diligence" means "that degree of attention, continuous directed effort, and
timeliness as may reasonably be expected from, and are ordinarily exercised by, a person during a
regulatory review period." Id S 156(d)(3).
26 Id S 156(c)(1).
" Id S 156(c)(2).
16
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period of extension cannot exceed five years. 8 However, if the patent was
issued and clinical testing had begun, but FDA approval for commercial
marketing or use was pending at the time of enactment, the extension may
not exceed two years.29 The extension is then reduced so that the remaining
term of the patent after the regulatory review period does not exceed
fourteen years.3 Finally, if a product has more than one patent, only one of
the patents will be eligible for an extension.31
Generic drug manufacturers may file an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA)3 2 The application must show that the proposed conditions of
use, 33 the active ingredients,34 "the route of administration, the dosage form,
and the strength,"" and the labeling 6 of the new drug are the same37 as a
previously approved drug (referred in the statute as a "listed drug 3W). The
application must also show that the new drug is a bioequivalent 39 of a listed
0
drug.

The applicant must certify one of the following: (1) the patent
information of the listed drug has not been filed,41 (2) the patent has

2 35 U.S.C. S i56(g)(6)(A), S 156(c)(6)(B).
35 U.S.C. S 156(g)(6)(C).
,0Id. 156(c)(3).

" Id 5 156(c)(4).
3221 U.S.C. S 3550) (1994).
" 1d S3556)(2)(A)(i).
4M

3556)(2)(A)(ii).

351d S 355()(2)(A)(iii).
3 142 S 3550)(2)(A)(v).
'" If the new drug has a different active ingredient or route of administration, dosage form, or
strength than that of a listed drug, the applicant may have to conduct clinical investigations to show the
safety and effectiveness of the new drug or any of its active ingredients, route of administration, dosage

form or strength which differs from the listed drug to receive approval. 21 U.S.C. S 3556)(2)(C)(i).
Further, the application must -show that the active ingredients of the new drug are of the same
pharmacological or therapeutic class as those of the listed drug.. . the new drug can be expected to have
the same therapeutic effect as the listed drug when administered to patients for a condition of use

previously approved for a listed drug." Id. S 3556)(2)(A)(iv). However, the application will be rejected
if any drug with a different active ingredient cannot "be adequately evaluated for approval as safe and
effective on the basis of the information required to be submitted in an abbreviated application." Id. S

355()(2)(C)(ii).
s Id. S 3556)(2)(A)(i).
"
A drug shall be considered a bioequivalent of a listed drug if the rate and extent of absorption of

the drug do not show a significant difference from that of the listed drug when administered under similar
experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses. Id. S 3556)(8)(B)().
21 U.S.C. S 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
Id S 3556)(2)(A)(vii)(I).
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expired, 42 (3) the date on which such patent will expire,4" or (4) the patent "is
invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new
drug for which the application is submitted.""
'The application is given approval or disapproval within 180 days.4 If the
generic drug falls into the first or second category, the approval of such
application is immediate,' whereas under the third classification, the
approval is effective upon the date of the patent expiration.4" If the generic
drug falls under the fourth category, the applicant must give notice"8 to the
patent owner. 9 Then, the patent owner has forty-five days to file an action
for infringement.' ° If no action is filed, approval is effective immediately. 1
If such action is brought, approval depends upon the court's decision. 2
Finally, the Patent Term Restoration Act provides that generic drug
manufacturers can begin testing before the patent on the brand name drug
has expired. Thereby, the generic drug would hit the market as soon as the
patent expired, since
it shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses

reasonably related to the development and submission of

42

21 U.S.C. S 355()(2)(A)(vii)(ll).

i S 3556)(2)(A)(vii)(Il.
" Id S3550)(2)(A)(vii)(v).
S 3550)(5)(A).
Id S 355)(4)(B)(i).
4

41Id.

21 U.S.C. S 3556)(4)(B)(ii).
The notice

shall state that an application, which contains data from bioavailability or
bioequivalence studies, has been submitted under this subsection for the drug with
respect to which the certification is made to obtain approval to engage in the
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of such drug before the expiration of the patent
referred to in the certification. Such notice shall include a detailed statement of the
factual and legal basis of the applicant's opinion that the patent is not valid or will not
be infringed.
Id. 5 355G)(2)(B)(ii).
"
'

Id S3556)(2)(B)(i).
Id S3550)(4)(B)(iii).
Id. 355)(4)(B)(iii).

"If...the court decides that such patent is invalid or not infringed, the approval shall be made
"
effective on the date of the court decision." 21 U.S.C. S 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)(). "If.. . the court decides that
such patent has been infringed, the approval shall be made effective on such date as the court orders under

section 271(e)(4)(A) of title 35." Id. S 3556)(4)(B)(iii)(fl).
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information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."
In conclusion, the Patent Term Restoration Act was a win-win situation
that benefitted both the brand name drug manufactures, who received
additional time on their patents, and the generic manufacturers, who
obtained an abbreviated FDA approval process, and could begin research and
development on drugs before the expiration of a patent.
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE PATENT FAIRNESS ACT OF 1999 BY THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The proposed Patent Fairness Act applies to drugs whose patents were in
force on September 24, 1984' and claims a drug product,"5 a method of using
a drug product, 6 or a method of manufacturing a drug product. 7 The patent
owner or an agent must submit an application to the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office."8 Parties who may be aggrieved by the
restoration may also submit information."
The proposed Act provides that the Commissioner shall restore the term
of the patent if the regulatory period' exceeded sixty months,6' and "there
is not substantial evidence overcoming the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant for the patent term restoration for the drug product acted with due
diligence . . . during the [regulatory] period."62 The Commissioner, in
making a determination, may request and obtain records from the FDA.63
The restoration term is equal to the regulatory period reduced by any
period in which the applicant failed to act with due diligence.' The

s3 35 U.S.C. S 271(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).

", Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(i). See also Legislation:Bill Would Provide 'Pipeline'Drugswith
Patent Term Extensions, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHT L.DAILY NEWS, May 11, 1999, available
in Westlaw, BNA-PTD Database (describing the aspects of the proposed legislation).
" Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(1)(A).
6 Id S(2)(a)(1)(b)(1)(B).
" Id (2)(a)(1)(b)(1)(C).
' Id 5(2)(a)(1)(b)(2).
59

Id

'e Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(2)(A). Regulatory period isdefined in 35 U.S.C. S 156(g)(1)(B)(ii).
61 Patent Fairness Act, S 2(a)(1)(b)(2)(A).
6'
6"

"

Id$ 2(a)(1)(o)(2)(B).

Id S (2)(a)(1)(b)(3).
Id S (2)(a)(1)(b)(4)(A).
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restoration term plus any previous restoration extensions pursuant to the
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 cannot exceed five years,65 and the total
patent term after the FDA approval cannot exceed 14 years." Since the
pipeline drugs have already been given a two-year extension, they would
only be eligible for a maximum extension of three years.
Procedurally, the patent owner would have ninety days from the
enactment of the Act to file for an extension.67 Furthermore, the Act
provides that within thirty days, the Commissioner shall publish a notice of
the application in the Federal Register." Within thirty days of the published
notice, aggrieved parties must submit information or comments concerning
the application.6 9 Upon the expiration of the thirty days, the Commissioner
70
has seven days to forward the aggrieved party's comments to the applicant.
The applicant can submit a response to the Commissioner within thirty
days of the receipt of the comments. 71 Once the Commissioner receives a
response, a determination of whether to grant the extension is made within
thirty days.72 Therefore, the total process would take a maximum of 127
days (approximately four months) from the time of filing to the
Commissioner's decision.
If the patent, which has met the above standards, would expire before a
determination would be made, the patent is automatically extended until
such determination is made to grant the extension,73 or sixty days after the
determination is made not to extend. 4 During the sixty-day period, the
applicant may appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for "an order
directing the Commissioner to extend the patent pending judicial review. "7
If other drug manufacturers have begun the process to obtain FDA
approval for equivalents of the pipeline drugs, the Patent Fairness Act
provides for some compensation. If an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA), has been filed with the Food and Drug Administration and "such

IL S(2)(a)(1)(b)(4)(C).
Patient Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(4)(B)(U).
61 Id (2)(a)(1)(6)(A).
" Id $ (2)(a)(1)(b)(6)(B)(i).
69 Id S (2)(a)(1)(b)(6)(B)C).
'0 Id S (2)(a)(1)(b)(6)(B)(i).
" Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(6)(B)(iii).
72 ,L S (2)(a)()(b)(6)(B)(-v).
" Id S (2)(a)(1)(b)(6)(C)(i).
"

Id S (2)(a)(t)(b)(6)(C).
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application has been found by the [FDA] on or before the date of the
enactment of this section to be sufficiently complete to permit substantive
review, such person shall be entitled to compensation of $1,000,000 by the
patent owner." 6 The patent owner's liability, however, cannot exceed
$5,000,000.7 Otherwise, the filing of an ANDA does not affect the grant of
the restoration term."
Finally, within one year after the enactment, the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark office shall submit a report to Congress evaluating the
patent term restoration review procedure and shall make a recommendation
of "whether Congress should consider establishing such a patent term review
procedure for patents not covered by such section.""
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE DRUG PATENT TERM RESTORATION
REVIEW PROCEDURE ACT OF 1999 BY THE SENATE

In contrast to the Patent Fairness Act, the proposed Drug Patent Term
Restoration Review Procedure Act in the Senate places the burden on the
patentee to establish by "clear and convincing evidence that [he or she] acted
with due diligence."" The patentee must also show that "granting the patent
restoration would not be detrimental to the public interest and the interest
of fairness.""1 The Commissioner, in making a determination, may and
should consider factors such as the commercial availability of alternative
treatments for the condition treated by the patented drug, the impact of the
tension on society's interest in encouraging and rewarding pharmaceutical
research and innovation, and the unfairness to the patentee in denying the
application. 2 Lastly, compensation is $2 million to the drug manufacturers,

"

Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(d).

"

Id S(2)(d)(2)(A).
Id Sa(2)(e).

Idg S(2)(0.

" Drug Patent Term Restoration Review Procedure Act, S 1(b)(1)(b)(2)(A)(ii). See also Legislation:
HousePanelConsiders Bill to IncreaseTerm Extension Tennfor 'Pipeline'Patents,BNA PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. DAILY NEWS, July 22, 1999, availablein Westlaw, BNA-PTD Database (stating that

S. 1172 places the burden on the patentee to prove due diligence).
" Drug Patent Term Restoration Review Procedure Act, S 1(b)(I)(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also Legislation:

Senate Bill Would Extend PatentTerm for DrugsStalled in Regulatory 'Pipeline," BNA PAT., TRADEMARK
&COPYRIGHT L. DAILYNEWS,June 16,1999,availableinWestlaw, BNA-PTD Database (CS. 1172 makes
term extension further contingent on a showing that it would not be 'detrimental to the public interest

and the interest of fairness.' ").
' Drug Patent Term Restoration Review Procedure Act, S 1(b)(1)(b)(7).
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who have begun to seek FDA approval for equivalents of the patented drug,
with the liability cap set at $10 million.83 Other than the above mentioned
differences, the two proposals are similar.
D. DRUGS AFFECTED

The pipeline drugs whose patents are still running that would be affected
by the pending legislation are: Claritin, an antihistamine; Relafen, an
arthritis drug; Cardigen-82, a diagnostic imaging agent; Nimotop, a drug used
in the treatment of head trauma; Dermatop, a skin rash drug; Penetrex, an
urinary tract infection medication; and Eulexin, a prostate cancer
treatment. 4
The table below shows more information about the drugs."
Drug

Maker

Patent
No.

Expiration
Date of
Patent

Date of
FDA
Approval

Total Patent
Life After
Approval

Claritin*

Schering-Plough

4,282,233

06-19-02

04-12-93

9.2 years

Relafen

SmithKline
Beecham Corp.

4,420,639

12-13-02

12-24-91

11.0 years

Daypro*

G.D. Searle

4,190,584

08-08-99

10-29-92

6.8 years

Cardiogen-82

Bracco Diag.

4,400,358

08-23-02

12-29-89

12.7 years

Eulexin

Schering-Plough

4,329,364

05-11-01

01-27-89

12.3 years

Ninotop

Bayer

4,406,906

09-27-02

12-28-88

13.8 years

Dermatop*

Hoechst Marion
Roussel

4,242,334

08-02-00

10-05-93

6.8 years

Penetrex

Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer

4,359,578

11-16-01

12-31-91

9.9 years

.These drugs received an additional extension pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreement
Act, of 22.5 months, 5.3 months, and 7.1 months, respectively.

Id S 1(e).
"BillsSeek PatentExtensionsforClaritin,OtherPrescriptionDrugs, ANDREWSINTELL.

PROP. LITIG.
REP., October 14, 1999, available in Westlaw, ANIPLR Database.
" Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Pharm.D., Ph.D., PatentExtension of PipelineDrugs: Impact on U.S.
HealthCareExpenditures,PRIME INsTrruTE, College of Pharmacy, July 28,1999, availableat < http://
www.house.gov/berry/prescriptiondrugs/schondelmeyer.htm x
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m. ANALYSIS
A. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

1. Proponents.
a. A Process,NotA PredeterminedOutcome. Proponents of the Patent
Fairness Act insist that this legislation establishes a fair and consistent
process, and not a predetermined outcome, to decide whether to restore lost
patent life due to delays in FDA approval.8 6 The proponents argue that
individual cases of inequities are often overlooked by statutes, such as the
Patent Term Restoration Act, and therefore warrant special legislation. 7 An
example of such inequity would be a longer than necessary or expected FDA
regulatory review period, which significantly reduces the life of the patent. 8
Therefore, the legislation intends to send the message that diligence in
seeking FDA approval will be rewarded. 9
Thus far, Congress has tackled each patent extension situation on an ad
hoc, case-by-case basis, which is time-consuming and inefficient for both
Congress and the drug company that is seeking an extension.' Often
"[p]atent extensions- regardless of their merits- are snuck into a bill in the
middle of the night, by some [c]ongressman or [s]enator, regardless of the
consequences."91 The restoration of patent life is a general problem, and each
company lobbying for its own patent extension may result in even more
inequities. For example, some companies may not have the resources or
money to successfully lobby for relief. Therefore, establishing a process

LegislativeHearingon H.R. 1598, "The PatentFairnessAct of1999," Before the Subcommittee on the
CourtsandlntellectualPropertyofthe Committee on theJudiciary U.S. House ofRepresentatives, 106th Cong.
(July 1, 1999), availablein 1999 WL 461839 (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott).
87 LegislativeHearingon H.R. 1598, "The PatentFairnessAct of1999," Before the Subcommittee on the
Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong.
(1999), availablein 1999 WL 461838 (statement of Rep. Ed Bryant); Hearings,supranote 8 (statement of
Peter Barton Hutt).
' Hearings,supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).
Legislative Hearingon H.R. 1598, "The PatentFairnessAct of 1999," Before the Subcomm. on the
Courts and Intellectual PropertyCommittee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong.
(1999), available in 1999 WL 461851 (statement of Jonathan Spicehandler, M.D., President, ScheringPlough Research Institute).
Hearings,supra note 87 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
" Hearings,supra note 86 (statement of Rep. McDermott).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2000

11

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 8:145

whereby the companies may seek redress would be a more effective and
practical method.92
A company that believes its product was unintentionally deprived of
patent protection should and must have the opportunity to present its case.93
The process, akin to a court hearing, will be conducted in a public forum, by
the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO), an independent, non-political review
board subject to judicial review. The proponents believe that "[t]he Patent
and Trademark Office [rather than Congress or even the Food and Drug
Administration] is the right place to hold a hearing about these issues,
because these issues involve questions not of medical research, but go to the
core of the definition of patent life."94 This process will "ensure that all who
seek private relief are treated with uniform fairness.""' "The review board
would be bound by objective criteria, " ' and "there is no preferential
treatment for any affected pipeline drug."" Thus the legislation protects
patent integrity 8 and takes politics out of the equation."

2. Opponents.
a. A Virtual Guarantee ofan Extension. Opponents argue that the
legislation "virtually guarantee[s] a patent extension [for the pipeline
drugs]." ° The legislation grants an extension where "there is no substantial
evidence overcoming the rebuttable presumption that the applicant for
patent term restoration for the drug product acted with due diligence...
during the [regulatory period]." 1 ' The brand name drug manufacturers can
easily satisfy the due diligence requirement, since "[d]ue diligence in this case
means little more than the applicant was actively seeking to have the patent

92 Hearings,supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).

145 CONG. REc. E796-01 (daily ed. April 28, 1999) (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott).
Hearings,supra note 86 (statement of Rep. McDermott); see also, LegislativeHearingon H.R.1398,
"ThePatentFairnessActof1999," Before the Subcommittee on the CourtsandlntellectualPropertyCommittee
on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (July 1, 1999), availablein 1999 WL 461855
(statement of the Hon. Bruce A. Lehman, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Intellectual
Property Institute) (stating the approach of H.R. 1598 is sound public policy).
s Hearings,supra note 94 (statement of Lehman, J.).
145 Cong. Rec. E796-01.
R
Id
9'Hearings,supra note 87 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
" 145 Cong. Rec. E796-01.
100
LegislativeHearingon H.R. 1598, "The Patent FairnessAct of1999," Before the Subcommittee on the
CourtsandIntellectualPropertyofthe Committee on the JudiciaryU.S. HouseofRepresentatives, 106th Cong.
(July 1, 1999), availablein 1999 WL 461844 (statement of Judge Marion Berry).
101 Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(2)(B).
3

'"
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approved."' 0 2 In fact, no case law exists dealing with the issue of due
diligence with regard to the patent extensions.
More importantly, because the patentee gets a presumption of due
10 3
diligence, the burden to overcome the presumption is on the wrong party.
Only an aggrieved party, such as a generic drug manufacturer would
challenge the extension, but that "party may not have access to the FDA
records or to the company records to overcome the presumption."'
Another objection to the legislation is the role of the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). The opponents argue that there is "[no] credible
[evidence] that the [PTO] has sufficient knowledge [and understanding] of
the FDA and its processes or pharmaceutical policy [to justify] this
delegation of authority."' Also, the PTO may "potentially undercut [the]
scientific judgments made by the FDA and its advisory committees." 1' 6 The
FDA's participation is not required, but rather the FDA is given a significant
consultative role.0 7 However, questions may arise about the impartiality of
the FDA, given that the agency itself might have been at fault for the
delays.0 8
Finally, the applicant may get an extension just by initiating the process.
Should an extension be denied by the PTO, the applicant can appeal to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals."° Such appeals may prevent the hearing
of the patent claims before the expiration of the patent due to the backlog in
courts." 0 Therefore, while the court is reviewing the case, the patent is
automatically extended."' The patents of the pipeline drugs are due to expire

102Hearings,supra note

100 (statement of Hon. Berry).
LegislativeHearingon H.R. 1598, "The PatentFairnessAct of1999," Before the Subcommittee on the
Courtsand IntellectualPropertyCommittee on theJudiciary US. House ofR epresentatives, 106th Cong. (July
1, 1999), availablein 1999 WL 461847 (statement of Bruce Downey, Chairman of Barr Laboratories, on
behalf of the Coalition for Affordable Pharmaceuticals).
104 f,4
104 Id.
10

"6 PTO Not Qualified to Judge FDA Review of"Pipeline"Products-Barr, THE PINK SHEET, August 9,
1999, availablein 1999 WL 8676595 (quoting Sen. Leahy (D-Vt.)).
107Id
108 Id.
'm Patent Fairness Act, S (2)(a)(1)(b)(6)(C)(ii).
n PTO Not Qualifiedto Judge FDA Review of 'Pipeline"Products.Barr,supra note 106.

.. LegislativeHearingonH.R. 1598, "ThePatentFairnessActof1999," Before the Subcommittee on the
CourtsandIntellectualPropertyCommitteeon thejudiciaryU.S. House ofRepresentatives,106th Cong. (July
1, 1999), availablein 1999 WL 461850 (statement of Andrew M. Berdon, Vice President and General
Counsel ofFaulding Inc. and Purepac Pharmaceutical Company, on behalfofthe Coalition for Affordable
Pharmaceuticals).
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soon, and thus there is a high likelihood that the patents will need to be
extended pending this process. Thereby, the patentee may obtain an
extension, even if later it is shown that the patentee initially caused the FDA
delays.
b. OtherAlternativesShould Be Pursued. Some opponents believe that
rather than spending time and resources on this legislation, the
pharmaceutical industry would be better served by pursuing other
alternatives. One recommendation is placing "a [legislative cap] on prices
which may be charged for drugs, perhaps tied to the actual expense put into
the research (divided by the number of potential consumers)."" 2 Another
example is a measure "reducing Federal Food and Drug Administration
approval times, if it is done without sacrificing safety."' Thereby, both the
drug industry and consumers would benefit," 4 rather than only the brand
name drug manufacturers, as in this case. The Coalition for Affordable
Pharmaceuticals has suggested: "closing loopholes, speeding [FDA]
approvals, and expanding coverage to new classes of drugs such as generic
biotechnology derived-drug products.".. Finally, another solution may be
to give all patented drugs the same post-market exclusivity period,1 6 rather
than extending patents on a case-by-case basis.
c. Issue Has Already Been Debated. Opponents point out that
Schering-Plough, the maker of Claritin, has already had the opportunity on
more than one occasion to present its case. Soon after Congress extended the
effective patent life of Daypro by roughly five years in 1996,17 ScheringPlough began lobbying for extension of the Claritin patent."' ScheringPlough has reportedly spent over $11 million on lobbying over the past three
years. 1 9

112

Jonathan L. Mezrich, The Patentabilityand Patent Term Extension ofLifesaving Drugs: A Deadly

Mistake, 6J.L. & HEALTH 111, 128 (1991/1992).

' ProposedDrug PatentExtensions 'Will Cost US Consumers $11 Billion," MAY.KETLETTER, August
16,1999, availablein 1999 WL 9321329 (quoting Dr. Schondelmeyer).
114

Id

"' Hearings, supra note 103 (statement of Bruce Downey).
BNA
16Drugs:GenericDrugMakers,ConsumerAdvocatesOpposeExtendingPatentsforPipelineDrugs,
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY NEWS, August 6,1999, available in Westlaw, BNA-PTD

Database.
...
Hearings, supra note 87 (statement of Rep. Bryant); see also, Charles Babcock, PatentFight Tests
Drug Firm's Clout; Claritin Maker Goes All Out in Congress, WASH. POST, October 30, 1999, at Al,
availablein 1999 WL 23311914.
11*
'

Babcock, supranote 117.
Nick Anderson, Schering.PlougbPushes Bill on Patent,L.A. TIMES, November 17, 1999, at C3,
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Schering-Plough lobbied tenaciously to add this monopoly extension to
the following bills: Omnibus Patent Act of 1997,120 1998 Omnibus
Appropriations Bill, and Omnibus Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999.121
One opponent characterized the last attempt as "an effort that continued
until the bitter end despite news reports exposing the provision as another
infamous 'special interest' rider."" The extensions were debated and always
denied.12
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT

1. Proponents. Short Approval Timefor PipelineDrugsAssumption. The
proponents cite two fundamental reasons as to why the two-year limitation
was included for pipeline drugs: (1) an incentive to continue the FDA
approval process and (2) an assumption that the pipeline drugs would be
24
approved shortly after the enactment of the 1984 legislation.
Manufacturers who had begun to seek FDA approval by submitting an
Investigative New Drug application "had already made the decision to invest
resources inthe drug and therefore less of an economic incentive was needed
to assure continued pursuit of the drug to final FDA approval-particularly
when it was anticipated that approval would come not long after enactment
of the legislation." 12 ' Accordingly, an extension of two years was given as12 an
6
incentive to complete the FDA approval process and market the drugs.
The drafters of the Patent Term Restoration Act gave the pipeline drugs
only a two-year extension based on the assumption that since the average
time for FDA approval was 2.25 years at that time, 2 ' approval time would
be approximately the same for the pipeline drugs. Therefore, a five-year
restoration period seemed excessive and unjustified, but a two-year period

available in 1999 WIL 26196449.
the end of the 1997 session, there was an effort to award additional
" Besides seeking an extension, 'at
market exclusivity for specific products in exchange for a 3%royalty payment to the National Institutes
of Health, with no prohibition against the companies passing on this royalty payment to consumers."
Hearings, supra note 111 (statement of Andrew M. Berdon).
1

id.
Id

'" Hearings,supra note 103 (statement of Bruce Downey).

u' Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).
12sId
126 Id

1v Id
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seemed appropriate given the anticipated short period of time between the
date of enactment and the date of FDA approval for the pipeline drugs.'
For the most part, the assumption proved to be true.""
However, for all of the pipeline drugs, that are the subject of the
legislation, the approval time was well beyond two years, a result not
contemplated by the drafters. 3 Total regulatory time was over seven years
for Penetrex, Dermatop, Nimotop, Relafen, and Cardiogen-82, and over 21.3
years for Daypro."' Therefore, the proponents argue that some measures
need to be taken to compensate for the inequities that resulted from the
miscalculation of approval time,"' and to fulfill the intent of the Patent
Term Restoration Act.

2. Opponents.
a. BroaderPolicy of the Patent Term RestorationAct. The opponents
argue that the policy of the Patent Term Restoration Act was to encourage
future investment in research and development and not to reward past
investment.' Pipeline drugs obviously did not need this incentive," since
they were not new and innovative drug products, but drugs that were
already under review by the FDA at the time of negotiations of the Patent
Term Restoration Act. 3 ' Further, during the negotiations, no dissident
pharmaceutical manufacturer challenged the two-year limit on patent
extensions for pipeline drugs.' 36
Therefore, according to Andrew M. Berdon:
The decision to grant a two-year extension to the pipeline
drugs was a carefully considered policy decision to create a
process which has proven successful in assuring high-quality
research and development in conjunction with providing

122

Id

129Id
130Id.

Powell, supra note 9.
Hearings,supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).
'3 Frederick, supra note 3. The article reports that the co-author of the Patent Term Restoration Act,
Representative Henry Waxman, has recently stated that pipeline drugs did not receive five years because
the point of the patent extensions was to encourage the research and development of future products.
t Hearings,supra note 100 (statement of Judge Marion Berry).
, Hearings,supra note 111 (statement of Andrew M. Berdon).
3 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisionsfor Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their
131
13'

Usefidness?, 39 IDEA 389, 406 (1999).
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access to affordable pharmaceuticals in a competitive
marketplace.
With H.R. 1598 [the Patent Fairness Act], certain brand
name companies, led by Schering-Plough Corporation, are
selectively attempting to undo the policy decision struck in
1984-the policy that all sides agreed to-in order to extend
their monopoly periods at the expense of competition,
consumer savings, and healthcare costs without a
corresponding benefit to the consumer.137

The pipeline drugs received the appropriate patent life extensions and
"[t]hus, the recent claims by pipeline patent owners that they were
inadvertently shortchanged by the 1984 Act and deserve additional
extensions as a matter of equity is contradicted by the legislative history of
the Act."' 38
In Merck & Co. v. Kessler, the court stated that "[t]his restoration period
does not recover the full time lost from the patent term due to FDA's
premarket approval process but merely 'ameliorates the loss incurred when
patent terms tick away while the patented product is awaiting [FDA's]
regulatory approval for marketing.' ")139
b. Awareness oftheApprovalProcess. Finally, drug manufacturers were
already aware of the interplay between the patent system and FDA approval
for pharmaceuticals before the development of their drugs.4" Therefore, the
drug manufacturers made an informed decision to develop the pipeline
drugs. 4 ' Furthermore, after FDA approval, the manufacturers were aware
of how much time they had remaining on their patents.'42 Before marketing
the pipeline drugs, the companies most likely established a price that would
at a minimum recover their original investment and make a reasonable
return. 4,3 Therefore, granting up to three additional years of monopoly

137

' Engelberg, supra note 136, at 407 n.67.
"' Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting

Unined, Inc. v. Quigg, 888 F.2d 826, 829, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1644, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
14' Hearings, supra note 100 (statement of Hon. Berry).
141

Id

142

Id

143

Id
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pricing rights for these products will result in a windfall of billions of
dollars.'"
4 Schering-Plough has already
c. Two ExtensionsAlreadyInExistence."'
received two extensions. Both were "unanticipated" when it first began
development of Claritin. All of the pipeline drugs received a two-year
extension pursuant to the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. With the
enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) of 1994'" and the
holding of Merck & Co. v. Kessler, some of the pipeline patents, including
Claritin, received additional patent time.
Pursuant to the URAA, which was enacted on December 8, 1994, the
United States changed the term of patents from the seventeen years from
issuance to twenty years from filing of the patent application. 4 , As a result
of this statute, patents issued from all applications (whether original
application, or continuation, divisional or continuation-in-part of pending
applications) filed on and after June 8, 1995, will have a term of twenty years
from the date of the original filing.4 4 However, patents in force and patents
based on an application pending in the Patent and Trademark Office before
June 8, 1995 are entitled to the greater of (1) the seventeen year term from
issuance or (2) the twenty year term from filing. 149
In Merck & Co. v. Kessler, each of the drug patents received a two-year
extension pursuant to the Patent Term Restoration Act.'-s The URAA did
not address whether the patents issued before June 8, 1995 and which had
received a restoration extension under the Patent Term Restoration Act
would be entitled to have the additional time added to the twenty years from
14
145
'

Hearings, supra note 100 (statement of Judge Marion Berry).
Hearings, supra note 103 (statement of Bruce L. Downey).
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) of 1994, 35 U.S.C. S 154 (1994 & Supp. 1999).

147 /,

Id. S 154(a)(2). The section states
[siubject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a term
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date
on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the
application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications
under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the date on which the earliest such
application was filed.
149
St/
154(c)(1). The section reads
[t]he term of a patent that is in force on or that results from an application filed
before the date that is 6 months after the date of the enactment of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act shall be the greater of the 20-year term as provided in
subsection (a) or 17 years from grant, subject to any terminal disclaimers.
ISOMerck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1546, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
'~'
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filing. The PTO and FDA took the position that such patents would have
to choose between seventeen years from issuance plus the restoration
extension or twenty years from filing without the restoration add-on.'' The
PTO, relying on the language of 35 U.S.C. S 156(a), which states that the
term of a patent " 'shall be extended from the original expiration date of the
patent,' ",15 interpreted "original expiration date" to mean the date seventeen
years from issuance. 153 Further, the PTO had concerns that "adding the
restoration extension to the twenty-year term violates the fourteen-year cap
of S 156(c)(3), absent recalculation."" s Disagreeing with the PTO and FDA,
the holders of such patents filed suit.' Of the twelve patents at issue in the
case, only five were in force due to the restoration extension."'s The rest of
the patents would have been in force on June 8, 1995, even without the
57
restoration extension.
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit noted that
The purpose of the URAA was not to extend patent terms,
although it has that effect in some cases, but to harmonize
the term provision of United States patent law with that of
our leading trading partners which grant a patent term of 20
years from the date of filing of the patent application.'
Thereby, the court held that "pre-June 8, 1995 patents are entitled to add on
the restoration extension to a 20-year from filing term regardless of when
such extension is granted except for those patents kept in force on June 8,
1995, only because of a restoration extension."5 9 The court rejected the
PTO's interpretation, concluding that the "legislative history indicates that
the phrase 'original expiration date' "was inserted to mean" 'the term of the
patent had never been extended by a prior restoration extension.'" And, the
date was not limited to just one date. 16 Furthermore, the court held that

Id at 1548.
A (quoting 35 U.S.C. S156(a) (1994)).
I5
15 Id.

...Merck, 80 F.3d at 1548.
156 Id.
157 It/
"'

Id at 1547.

"'

Id at 1550.
Merck, 80 F.3d at 1550.

"o
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"the 14-year period is a mandatory limit on the extended term and must be
given effect.
Thus, some pre-June 8, 1995 extensions may need

adjustment. "

161

C. THE SOURCE OF DELAY OF FDA APPROVAL

1. Proponent.
a. DelayDuetoFDA. The proponents of the legislation argue-that the
patentees were not at fault for the delays at the FDA level. They cite the
shortage of personnel and resources at the FDA as the source of the delays,16
163
rather than issues concerning the patented product's medical safety.
Problems at the FDA in the 1980's ultimately led Congress to pass the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992.1" Further, since Congress has
previously extended patents for delays caused by the FDA, it seems only just
that Schering-Plough and the makers of the other pipeline drugs receive the
same treatment.
b. Comparable to Other Statutes. Proponents of the Patent Fairness
Act point out that the Patent Term Restoration Act made "no attempt to
address unusual or unique situations of lengthy regulatory review for which
accepted principles of fairness and equity would justify exceptions." 16 The
proponents point to seven specific occasions when Congress "has enacted
legislation to address particular FDA-regulated products where application
of the general rules in the 1984 Act would have been unfair and
inequitable."'" They cite the following products: Aspartame (food additive),
Forane (new drug), Impro (new animal drug), the oral hypoglycemia drugs,
Glyburide (new drug), Lopid (new drug), Olestra (food additive), 2nd
Daypro (new drug). The history behind the extension of the patents for the
above products warrants some discussion.

161
"'
"'
'"

at 1551.

Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).
Hearings, supra note 86 (statement of Rep. McDermott).
Hearings,supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).

6Id

"Id For an in-depth analysis of the enactment of the statutes, see Richard M. Cooper, Legislative
Patent Extensions, 48 FOoD & DRUG LJ. 59 (1993).
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165

69
68
7
Of the seven products, four products, Aspartame," Forane,1 Impro,
and the oral hypoglycemic drugs" ° were not subject to the Patent Term
Restoration Act. However, Congress did enact special patent extensions
based on extenuating circumstances. 7 ' In the Aspartame, Forane, and oral
hypoglycemia drugs cases, the extensions covered delays above and beyond
the normal regulatory review period, which were caused by the FDA and
not the patentee.'
In the Impro case, the delay was caused by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), resulting in an almost zero patent
life after approval.'7 3 In all of these cases, the patentee had submitted the
necessary information, but due to FDA errors, the marketing of their
products were delayed more than necessary.7 4

" The Aspartame patent was not subject to the Patent Term Restoration Act, since the FDA
approved it before 1984. Nevertheless, Aspartame received almost a six-year extension. The developers
of Aspartame, G.D. Searle & Co., received a patent in 1970 and received FDA approval in 1974.
However, when two private parties objected to the approval, raising questions about the authenticity of
the laboratory reports, the FDA imposed a stay of approval on December 5,1975. After almost six years,
the FDA formally declared that the laboratory results submitted by Searle were in fact authentic, and that
Searle was not at fault for the delay. Aspartame was granted final approval for commercial marketing
effective October 5, 1981. The patent extension covered the period from imposition of the stay to the
final approval. Cooper,supra note 166, at 65.
'" The story of Forane is similar to aspartame. Forane was patented in 1970. During the FDA
approval process, the FDA notified the patentee, by letter dated February 20,1976, that the product's new
drug application was not approved due to a report raised by a doctor that the Forane's inhalation agents
may have carcinogenic potential. Later, the doctor's report was found to be deficient, and on May 26,
1981, Forane received final FDA approval after more than ten years after the issuance of its patent. Here
again, the makers of Forane, Ohio Medical Anesthetics, Inc., were not at fault, and Forane's patent was
extended for five years and three months, covering the period from the delay due to the doctor's study
to the final approval. Cooper, supra note 166, at 66.
"6 Impro is a veterinary biological product subject to approval by the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA). The USDA denied approval, concluding the product was ineffective based on its
own study on Impro. Ultimately, a federal court found the USDA report was false and misleading.
However, the delay in approval and the litigation resulted in a lost patent life of 16 years. Therefore,
Congress granted a fifteen-year patent extension. Cooper, supra note 166, at 67-68.
"7 Five oral hypoglycemic drug patents were extended to an uniform expiration date, resulting in
extensions from three years to nearly six years. Although the FDA concluded the drugs were safe and
effective in 1974, they were not approved for marketing due to an issue of class labeling. The patentees
offered to market with temporary labeling, but the FDA denied the request. Even after the FDA gave
assurances that the issue would be resolved quickly, ten years would pass before the issue would be
resolved. Cooper, supra note 166, at 68-69.
171 Hearings,supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).
172

Id.

..
3 See supra text accompanying note 169.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2000

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 6

J.INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 8:145

The patent on Lopid, "' a cardiovascular drug, was specially extended by
Congress following the enactment of the Patent Term Restoration Act.176
The patent was issued in 1972. In 1981, Lopid received approval on a limited
basis, provided that the makers, Warner-Lambert, continued financing a
heart attack prevention study by the Helsinki, Finland Heart Council.'"
Upon completion of the five-year study, Warner-Lambert expected FDA
approval on expanded uses of Lopid and marketing exclusivity for five
years."' With the enactment of the PTR Act, Lopid would only be entitled
to a patent extension of two years (since the patent was approved before 1984
and FDA approval was pending), and generic equivalents would be able to
compete immediately upon expiration of the patent. In light of the potential
harm to Warner-Lambert, Congress granted an extension of three years and
six months.' "
In April 1996, Congress passed a bill to extend the five-year marketing
exclusivity of Daypro,"8 ' a nonsteroid, antiinflammatory drug (NSAID),
known as Oxaprozin, for an additional two years.1 ' The makers of Daypro

"s

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-418, SS 9201-9202, 102 Stat.

1107, 1569-70. Section 9201 provides:
PATENT TERM EXTENSION. (a) GENERAL RULE.-Except as provided in
subsection (b), the term of United States Patent number 3,674,836 issued for the drug
Lopid shall be extended in accordance with section 9202 for 3 years and 6 months
from the date of its expiration.
(b) CONDrIONS.-(1) No extension of the term of the patent described in
subsection (a) may be made unless there has been submitted for the drug Lopid a
supplemental new drug application under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act for the approval of an expansion of the permitted indications and usage
in the labeling of the drug.
'76 Cooper, supranote
77

'
"'

166, at 69-72.

Id at 70.
Id at 69-72.
Id at 70.

Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, S 2105,
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-320. Section 2105 reads:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Any owner on the date of enactment of this Act of the right to
market a nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drug that-(1) contains a previously patented
active agent; (2) has been reviewed by the Federal Food and Drug Administration for
a period of more than 120 months as a new drug application; and (3) was approved
as safe and effective by the Federal Food and Drug Administration on October 29,
1992, shall be entitled, for the 2-year period beginning on October 29, 1997, to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing into the
United States such active agent, in accordance with section 154(a)(1) of title 35,
United States Code.
. 141 CONG. REC. 519,110, S19,118, (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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received a patent in 1971, filed an Investigational New Drug Application
(INDA) in 1972, and then filed the New Drug Application (NDA) in August
of 1982.1"2 On October 29, 1992, more than twenty years after obtaining a
patent, the Food and Drug Administration finally approved Daypro for
marketing." 3 At this point, Daypro had no remaining patent life since
patents lasted only seventeen years from issuance at that time."" Under the
Patent Term Restoration Act, Daypro was not eligible for any patent
extensions since the patent had expired.' However, Daypro was entitled to
five years of marketing exclusivity. 6
Furthermore, congressional testimony suggests that Daypro was not at
fault for the long delay. Rather, "the FDA effectively imposed a moratorium
on the approval of all NSAIDs" after serious problems were encountered
with previously approved NSAIDs'
The record further reflects that the
FDA did not impose this moratorium to collect further data or due to safety
and health concerns related to Daypro. In fact, the FDA later based its
approval on the original data submitted by the makers of Daypro.' The
approval time for Daypro was the longest of all the pending NSAIDs.'i 9 An
expired patent and an extremely long FDA approval process probably were
the major factors leading Congress to pass this bill.
The proponents of the Patent Fairness Act argue that the situation of the
pipeline drugs is similar to that of these drugs. The approval was delayed due
to the FDA and not the patentee. Just as the Patent Term Restoration Act
did not contemplate extenuating circumstances for Lopid and Daypro, it also
did not contemplate excessive approval times for the pipeline drugs.
Therefore, since Congress enacted special legislation for Lopid and Daypro
drugs, in all fairness it should similarly enact legislation for the pipeline
drugs.
2. Opponents
a. Delay Due to Patentee. The opponents of the Patent Fairness Act
argue that unanticipated delays in the FDA's review of Claritin does not

SMd. at S19,118.

115 Id.

U6 141 CONG. REC. S19,118.
1"' 141 CONG. REC. S19,110, S19,118, (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon).
188Id.
19 Id
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make this legislation fair."9 The opponents argue that it would be fair to
"reduce any new extension by the length of the unanticipated extensions it
has already secured."' 9 ' Further, the opponents attribute the delays to the
patentee, Schering-Plough. ' During the approval process, Schering-Plough
changed the product from a capsule to a tablet form.'93 As a result, the FDA
had to address bioequivalence issues. Additional studies needed to be
performed due to concerns of Claritin as a carcinogen.'"
D. TREATMENT OF BRAND NAME DRUGS V. GENERIC DRUGS

1. Proponents.
a. Cost of Drug Development. The proponents argue that the
treatment between brand name drugs.and generic drugs is quite disparate.
Brand name drug companies spend $20 billion on new drug research, and
generic companies spend less than $500 million."5
Generic drug
manufacturers also file an abbreviated new drug application, ANDA that
does not require duplicate testing for safety and effectiveness for generic
drugs equivalent to those drugs already approved."6 Although generic drug
companies charge approximately sixty percent less than brand name drug
companies, Schering-Plough argues that they do not contribute to research
and development of new drugs.' 97
Brand name drug manufacturers need a continued incentive to create new
drugs. "[D]rug products have helped to contain the total cost of health care
by shortening hospital confinement, eliminating the need for surgery,
curtailing visits to physicians and reducing the number of employee sick
days." 9 ' Therefore, drug development is critical. "The money to fund these
research and development projects comes from sales of existing drugs."'"

"0 Hearings,supra note 111, at 46 (statement of Andrew M. Berdon).
191

Id

192Id

194Id
19sHearings, supra note 8 (statement of Peter Barton Hutt).
1%Id
197Debate,USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 6859139.
19 Ronald L. Desrosiers, The DrugPatent Term Longtime Battlegroundin the Control ofHealth Care
Costs, 24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 115, 126 (1989).
199 I at 127.
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Furthermore, "drug research and development is a risky business." 200
Mandatory product testing and the low rate of success in bringing products
to the market are major drawbacks in drug development."0 ' Time and
money are wasted when manufacturers must abandon potential new
products.20 2 "Moreover, drug research and development expenditures are
'up-front' costs that offset marketing gains." 211 Other problems facing
pioneer drug companies are "limits on their ability to protect intellectual
property from competition, which in turn decreases revenue, and the
litigation risks of companies producing potentially dangerous products,
which increase expenditures." 21 "Market revenues are greatly diminished by
20
even small delays in the FDA approval process." 1
b. Comparison with Other Patented Products. Another significant
disparagement in the treatment of brand name drugs is illustrated when
comparing these drugs with other patented inventions.2' For example,
patents in the computer components and software industries are receiving
much more "life," approximately eighteen years after an estimated two-year
patent prosecution period. 7 These products often require "far less capital
and involve far less risk than is the case in pharmaceutical innovation."208
Even though the Patent Term Restoration Act attempts to compensate drug
manufacturers by extending the life of the patent, there is still a fourteen-year
cap on the remaining effective patent life after approval.
2. Opponents.
a. Profitable Drug Companies. Despite the alleged "hardships" on
brand name drug companies, these companies are making incredible profits.
The pharmaceutical industry has the highest level of net profit as a
percentage of revenue than any industry group in the United States.2 °
"Pharmaceutical firms have been the most profitable industry for nearly two

' Susan Kopp Keyack, The DrugPrice Competition and Patent Term RestorationAct of 1984: Is It a
Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147, 170 (1989).
201 i
202 Id
203 Id
2

Joseph P. Reid, A Generic DrugPriceScandal- Too Bitter aPillforthe DrugPriceCompetition and

Patent Term RestorationAct to Swallow?, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 309, 330 (1999).
Keyack, supra note 200, at 170.
Hearings,supra note 94 (statement of Hon. Bruce Lehman).
207 Id
Ida
Schondelmeyer, supra note 85.
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decades, and for two decades prior to that time, pharmaceuticals were the
second most profitable industry.""' It has further been reported that
"overall U.S. inflation between 1980- 1992 was 21.7 percent, but
pharmaceutical inflation during that same period was 128.4 percent, six times
the rate of general inflation."1
Claritin provides thirty-four percent of Schering-Plough's total revenue
worldwide, which was reported to be $7.3 billion in 1998.212 "Relafen and
Daypro are also major drugs with 1998 sales of $450 million and $300
million, respectively."'
The other five pipeline drugs, Cardiogen-82,
Eulexin, Nimotop, Dermatop, and Penetrex, collectively, are estimated to
have 1998 U.S. sales of about $170 million.1 4
b. Drug Pricingand Expenditures. Currently, there is no cap on the
prices of prescription drugs. High prices have been attributed to factors such
as "direct manufacturing costs, research and development costs, overhead,
clinical factors, marketing and distribution costs, and profit potential.""'
The price charged for a single drug is much more than the actual cost of
developing that drug.2 16
Specifically, the industry averages for administrative expenditures such as
marketing, advertising, and selling are about thirty percent of revenues.217
However, Schering-Plough's expenditures are about 38.9%.2' Further, the
industry average for research and development is twenty percent, whereas
Schering-Plough spends only 12.5%, which is considerably below the
industry average.219 Furthermore, prescription drug prices are expected to
increase to compensate for the increased rate of expenditures facing the
brand name drug manufacturers.2 2

210 Id

2. Robin Elizabeth Margolis, PrescriptionDrug Manufacturers Get Warning on Prices, 10 No. 3

HEALTHSPAN 19,19 (March 1993), availablein Westlaw, HTHSP Database.
212 Schondelmeyer, supra note 85.
213 J'4
214

Id.

"'sMary T. GriffinAidsDrugs & ThePbarmaceuticallndustry:A NeedforReform, 17 AM.J.L. & MED.
363, 371-372 (1991).
216 1Id
21 Schondelmeyer, supra note 85.
21' 1d.
219

Id.

2

Health Insurance Association of America, PrescriptionDrugs: Costand CoverageTrends (September

1999) <http://www.hiaa.org/news/news-state/prescriptiondrugs.htm> (reporting that the rate of
growth for expenditures is due to several critical factors including: '[1]direct-to-consumer advertising is
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Drug pricing also depends on the therapeutic advantage of the product
and the cost of alternative therapies. A current example would be "a major
breakthrough in a new therapeutic category where no substitutes exist, as in
the case of'AIDS drugs, carries a high profit potential and will be priced
according to such potential.""1 Similarly, when Claritin was introduced, it
had a high profit potential, since allergy medication was limited. Therefore,
the makers of Claritin have reaped the rewards on their investment.
c. The Costfor Delay of GenericDrugs. The availability of generics is
critical, especially since drug prices are not monitored. First, prescription
drugs are not always covered by Medicare or private health insurance plans,
requiring consumers to pay full price out of their own pockets." Second,
the elderly, often living on fixed incomes, require a greater amount of
prescription drugs.22 Furthermore, some consumers do not respond to the
drugs available. Therefore, by passing this legislation, the concern of these
consumers would be neglected.24
d. Life After the Expiration of a Patent. Brand name drugs will
continue to be profitable even without the patent term extension and even
with the introduction of generic drugs. One reason is while the Patent Term
Restoration Act gives only one patent extension, there is potentially no limit
on the number of patents a pharmaceutical manufacturer can obtain. 225 For
example, some critics charge that "pharmaceutical manufacturers develop
'me-too' products, that is, drugs differing only slightly from previously
developed drugs with arguably little or no added therapeutic value, in order
to obtain [additional] patents and higher prices for the new products."2 6
The second reason is prices are not automatically lowered upon the
introduction of generics in the market, since the brand name manufacturers

placing the burden on the provider to prescribe requested medications, despite cost or efficacy; [2] an
accelerated FDA approval process is creating market entry of numerous new and expensive treatment
options; [3] few incentives are in place to effectively manage cost and utilization through the health plan
and provider; [4] advent of drug therapy-intensive disease management programs is increasing utilization
and cost; and [5] [an] increasing elderly population is requiring more frequent and expensive drugs to treat
often several chronic and acute health conditions").
2. Griffin, supra note 215, at 372.
" Desrosiers, supra note 198, at 130.
22' The Patent Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1598 Before the Subcomm. on the Courts and
Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Gerald F. Meyer, Senior Consultant, AAC Consulting Group, Inc.).
n' Griffin, supra note 215, at 371.
226 Id
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will successfully advertise and promote their products to ensure continuing
support."" With new guidelines adopted by the FDA, 2 8 brand name drug
companies have more flexibility to directly advertise to consumers. Practices
such as sending representatives and free samples to physicians often result in
brand name loyalty. 9 Thereby, "[d]espite the revival of generics and
pressure to contain costs, physicians typically do not consider price
differentials when prescribing." 3 0
IV. CONCLUSION

Both supporters and opponents of the Patent Fairness Act have made
compelling arguments. The proponents of the Patent Fairness Act believe
this legislation will address inequities in the treatment of pipeline drugs,
drugs that had obtained a patent but were pending FDA approval when the
The proponents have
Patent Term Restoration Act was enacted.
any guarantees other
include
does
not
passionately argued that the legislation
than a process, whereby the manufacturers of the pipeline drugs can present
their case. No patent of a pipeline drug will be extended without the
necessary showing that the extension is justified. By foregoing this process,
Congress will have to continue to evaluate each patent extension exception,
and thereby incorporating politics, rather than fairness, into the equation.
The opponents argue the legislation is a guarantee, since the provisions
unfairly favor the patentee. The opposing party has the initial burden of
showing that the patentee did not act with due diligence and, should the
burden shift to the patentee, the patentee will easily satisfy the requirement
of due diligence since it is a low threshold. The opponents argue the
opposing party will be a generic drug manufacturer, who may not have
access to company records to make a case. Further, the FDA will be put in

2v

Id at 369.

2" The FDA issued final guidance concerning consumer-directed broadcast advertisements for
prescription drugs on August 6, 1999. Consumer-directed broadcast ads for prescription drugs must
contain: a. A toll-free number for consumers to call; b. A referral to a print advertisement in a
concurrently running print publication or the provision of product brochures in various convenient
outlets; c. A healthcare provider referral (to a physician, pharmacist, veterinarian, or other healthcare
provider); and d. An Internet Web page address. Ads broadcast over radio, television, and through
telephone communications systems must also include a thorough "major statement" prominently
disclosing all of the major risks associated with the drug.
m Griffin, supra note 215, at 369.
230 Id
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a compromising position. The legislation gives it a consultative role, while
at the same time the FDA may have been responsible for the delays, and
therefore, may be defending against the patentee, which is like being a judge
and defendant at the same time. The opponents argue that other measures,
such as increasing FDA approval, which serve both the drug industry and
consumers', should be pursued instead of wasting time and resources on this
legislation. This is particularly true given that the issue, at least in the
Claritin case, has been debated and denied on three occasions.
Both proponents and opponents agree that the purpose of the Patent
Restoration Act was to encourage future investments in drug development
and the two-year limitation was based on the fact that approval time was 2.25
years when the Act was debated. Proponents emphasize that the gross
miscalculation of time resulted in substantial inequities, which now must be
redressed, while the opponents argue the pipeline drugs did receive
appropriate extensions.
The opponents argue that the drug makers had already made the decision
before the Act to develop such drugs and some pipeline drugs have received
two unanticipated extensions. For example, Claritin received two years
pursuant to the Patent Term Restoration Act and 22.5 months with the
enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreement of 1994.
The proponents blame the shortage of personnel and resources at the
FDA level for the delays, whereas the opponents blame the patentees, at least
in the case of Claritin. Claritin had changed from a capsule to a tablet form
during the middle of the approval process, which may have caused additional
delays. The proponents further argue that in the past, where the FDA was
at fault, Congress has enacted special legislation extending the time of the
patents. Therefore, assuming the delay was caused by the FDA, these
pipeline drugs should have the same treatment.
Finally, the proponents argue that drug development is not only critical,
but also very costly and time consuming. Often, there are many trial
products which never reach the marketplace, and for the products that do
reach the marketplace, there are associated safety and health-related testing
costs. Generic equivalents often bypass much of the research and
development.
The opponents argue that the pharmaceutical companies are some of the
most profitable. In fact, the rise of prescription drugs has superceded the
general inflation increase. Furthermore, prescription drug prices are not
monitored; therefore consumers without insurance or with limited insurance
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are paying a hefty price for health care. Even without a patent or an
extension, brand name drugs most likely will continue to be profitable,
especially since some drugs have more than one patent.
As Congress prepares to debate the Patent Fairness Act and the Drug
Patent Term Restoration Review Act during the upcoming term, it will have
to decide whether to look backward, or forward. The proponents want
some compensation for delays that occurred in the past, while the opponents
argue that new drugs should be encouraged, rather than giving more money
to drugs that already exist.
SHILPA PATEL
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